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N icholas Tarling, given the long list of books bearing his name, has 
demonstrated an unequalled knowledge 
of Southeast Asia during the period 
framed by the build-up and denouement 
of the Pacific War. His latest book of a 
trilogy opens with a review of Southeast 
Asia just before the Korean War in 1950 
– only a few months after Mao Zedong 
had established the People’s Republic of 
China – and continues through the two 
major conferences of the mid-1950s, in 
Geneva and Bandung.
By this time, the defeat of French forces 
at Dienbienphu had signalled that Euro-
pean colonialism, in whatever form, 
had no future in Southeast Asia. As 
Tarling makes clear, this had long been 
accepted by the British as a matter of 
post-war realpolitik, and, though only by 
1949, by the Dutch as the result of force 
majeure. The French, however, faced a 
more difficult problem, for two reasons: 
first – after Mao’s 1949 victory – its col-
onies in Indochina were much closer to 
the West’s front-line confrontation with 
communism; and second, any conces-
sions in Southeast Asia would not go 
unnoticed by the indigenous popula-
tions of French North Africa, who were 
also claiming the right to independence. 
Nonetheless, following the 1954 defeat 
at Dienbienphu, the French, having 
nothing to gain by remaining in Indo-
china, simply ceased to be a factor in the 
equation. The implications of this pro-
vide the key to the diplomacy described 
in the second half of the book.
Playing dominoes
Tarling’s basic message is that every-
one was playing for time, waiting to see 
whether the critical states (as they were 
seen in the early 1950s) of Laos, Cambo-
dia, Burma and Thailand (Vietnam was 
still governed by France) would swing 
toward the communist East or the capi-
talist West. The West was haunted by 
domino-thinking long before the term 
gained world-wide currency as a result 
of its use by President Eisenhower’s 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. 
The threat – as perceived by the West 
– was of Chinese military intervention, 
which, after the Korean War (1950-53), 
never came. The Chinese did well to 
hold back, since at the end of the day 
only Thailand, under its opportunist 
leader General Pibun, joined the west-
ern alliance – a decision that would 
later prove extremely advantageous to 
that country. Indonesia, meanwhile, 
was a constant western pre-occupation, 
especially because its sights were set on 
western New Guinea, which was still 
retained – with strong Australian sup-
port – by the Netherlands.
The United Kingdom, although con-
stantly temporising, had accepted that 
all European colonies in Southeast 
Asia would sooner or later become 
independent, so that diplomacy in the 
whole region would have to be based 
on dealing with autonomous sovereign 
nations: on one side were India, Paki-
stan and Ceylon; on the other Australia, 
New Zealand and the U.S. All these 
countries, with their own self-interest at 
heart, were wary of new commitments 
in Southeast Asia, though Eisenhower 
and Dulles, while refusing to contem-
plate military intervention in Vietnam, 
had little choice but to commit consider-
able U.S. military and other aid follow-
ing the French defeat at Dienbienphu.
Cardboard characters
This is diplomatic history written by 
an undoubted expert. Its intensive use 
of primary sources, consisting mainly 
of telegrams, assumes not only that its 
readers have detailed regional knowl-
edge, but that they are also acquainted 
with a Tolstoyan cast of British ambas-
sadors and Foreign Office officials, min-
isters in the governments of France, the 
Netherlands and the U.S., all of whom 
are liable to replacement with changes 
of government – or simply in the nor-
mal course of duty – and whose opin-
ions and advice are repeatedly cited. 
To give but one example, a certain J. G. 
Tahourdain is mentioned in the index 
36 times, yet a Google search is needed 
to discover that he was the principal 
private secretary to the minister of state 
at the British Foreign Office – a man 
behind the scenes, par excellence. His 
advice (page 259) that ‘the moral of all 
this is never say die’ is also appropriate 
for Tarling’s readers: they have much to 
learn from his book about an extremely 
interesting period in modern world his-
tory, but far too many individuals are 
cited and far too little disclosed about 
who they were and why they counted. 
Particularly in a period so critical for the 
history of Southeast Asia after the end 
of the Pacific War, there must have been 
more to the world of diplomacy than 
the cardboard characters presented in 
Britain, Southeast Asia and the Impact 
of the Korean War. Although this is con-
firmed by a careful reading of Tarling’s 
book, its immediate impact is still too 
diffuse: one point, however, that does 
come through, is the underlying wis-
dom of Britain’s diplomacy at a very 
difficult time in its history. Here there 
is no doubting Tarling’s patriotic stance 
– which, in the opinion of this reviewer, 
is largely justified. <
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China’s Western Development Strat-egy (WDS) has pumped billions 
of yuan into developing Tibet. In July 
2006, for example, an impressive feat 
of engineering, the world’s highest rail-
way (Qinghai-Tibet), was inaugurated in 
celebration of the Chinese Communist 
Party’s 85th anniversary. Using official 
statistics and his own field observations, 
Andrew Martin Fischer explores the dif-
ferent ways government subsidies and 
large construction projects are affecting 
the lives of ordinary Tibetans.
The Tibetan Plateau stretches across 
the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), 
Qinghai and parts of adjacent provinc-
es. A large part of the ethnic Tibetan 
population lives in the TAR, but over 
half live in lower level administrative 
divisions (autonomous prefectures, 
counties and townships) in the four 
predominantly Chinese provinces of 
Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan. 
Extensive macro data on China’s eco-
nomic and social indicators has been 
available for some time, but before 
Fischer’s study was neglected by west-
ern scholarship on Tibet. Relevant data 
outside the TAR is mostly aggregated 
at the provincial level and is difficult 
to extrapolate for Tibetans. Hence 
the author wisely focused on socio-
economic conditions in the TAR and 
neighbouring Qinghai. 
State Growth and Social Exclusion in 
Tibet is based on the author’s doctoral 
dissertation for the London School of 
Economics. Graphic materials (one 
map, 26 tables, 19 figures, and 12 pho-
tos from the TAR, Qinghai and Sichuan) 
accompany his engaging analysis and 
qualitative field observations. The first 
two of the book’s six chapters place 
Tibet within the context of China’s 
political economy and its development 
over time. A methodological excursus 
(pages 6-12) provides useful pointers 
on the analysis and interpretation of 
Chinese statistics. 
Western Development 
Strategy: serving the people?
By 1996 the TAR’s economy had begun 
to expand, and Tibetans with a second-
ary education have so far been rela-
tive beneficiaries. Chapter III (pages 
32-87) is a masterful three-part study 
of the TAR and Qinghai economies 
under the WDS. The first part exam-
ines the growth and composition of 
the gross domestic product between 
1998 and 2001, during which China’s 
GDP expanded at an impressive annual 
average rate of 7.5%, that of Qinghai at 
12.2% and that of the TAR at a wallop-
ing 17.5%. While the economy’s primary 
sector (agriculture) remained generally 
sluggish, its secondary sector (construc-
tion, mining and industry) grew much 
faster than GDP in both the TAR and 
Qinghai. Meanwhile, expenditures for 
the TAR’s tertiary sector (government, 
party and social organisations) surged 
24.8% per year. The author concludes 
that the increase ‘probably indicates 
that an expansion of the control appara-
tus of the state was seen as an essential 
precondition to the subsequent steps 
of spending and investment under the 
WDS’ (page 45). He also notes the very 
large military presence in the TAR and 
that military expenditures are secret and 
not included in the tertiary sector. 
Chapter III’s second part examines the 
sources fuelling GDP growth, namely 
state subsidies. By 2003 subsidies from 
the central government and provinces 
had ballooned to 74% of the TAR’s 
entire GDP. Locally owned and man-
aged farms, commercial ventures and 
services have been wholly dwarfed, 
engendering extreme outside depend-
ence, imbalances in the local economy 
and an abdication of local power in 
decision-making. With the completion 
of the enormously expensive Qinghai-
Tibet railway (stretching 1,142 km from 
Golmud to Lhasa), the TAR’s economy 
is now at serious risk of going from 
boom to bust.
In chapter III’s third part Fischer notes 
the extreme inefficiency of the TAR 
growth model: GDP growth through 
expansion of government and admin-
istration is not self-sustaining and 
requires increasing subsidies in order 
to be maintained. Beijing and min-
ion provinces use public development 
funds to pay Chinese companies to 
undertake construction work in Tibet, 
with minimal consideration of the local 
population’s needs and without its par-
ticipation. Many construction projects 
are ill-conceived and shoddily carried 
out. Nevertheless, the author acknowl-
edges the cost-effectiveness of certain 
irrigation works in increasing agricul-
tural yields.
... or putting their interests 
on hold?
Chapters IV and V analyse the impact 
of growth upon household incomes 
and different population strata. Some 
85% of the Tibetan population of TAR 
and Qinghai is rural. Sharply declining 
terms of trade for staple products (wool 
and barley) combined with population 
growth, rising healthcare costs and 
environmental degradation have thrust 
over one-third of rural households into 
poverty or near-poverty. Tibetans real-
ise that secondary sector employment 
is likely to be better paid, thus many 
move to urban centres only to become 
an ethnic underclass. After five decades 
of Chinese public education, Tibetans 
have the lowest educational level of any 
major national minority. According to 
the 2000 census, illiteracy averaged 
9.1% nationally but was an atrocious 
47.3% among Tibetans. Because only 
15% of Tibetans have any secondary 
education, and because skilled Tibetan 
labour is in extremely short supply, 
hardly any Tibetans occupy manage-
rial or technical posts. Moreover, Han 
Chinese and Chinese Muslims from 
other provinces are crowding them 
out of administrative and commercial 
jobs. Development policy is apparently 
depriving Tibetans of control over their 
own future, at least in the short term.
As this is a socio-economic study largely 
based on an analysis of official govern-
ment statistics, Fischer does not address 
cultural issues such as literacy and fluen-
cy in Chinese or Tibetan, the destruction 
of Tibet’s traditional education system 
(monastic seminaries and universities) 
or the rights of occupied peoples. None-
theless, State Growth and Social Exclu-
sion in Tibet is a pioneering work that 
should greatly interest social policy and 
rural development students and schol-
ars, development agencies, friends of 
Tibet and China and human rights activ-
ists. The final chapter’s conclusions and 
recommendations on an array of practi-
cal measures (including the upgrading 
of primary and vocational education) to 
effectively improve the lot of Tibetans in 
‘autonomous’ areas should engage the 
attention of decision-makers in China. <
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